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INTRODUCTION 
During this past year I have been working on some aspects of 
the thought of the English nineteenth century philosopher John 
Stuart Mill. When my husband and I were in London last January 
we visited the National Portrait Gallery and while there looked 
for Mill's portrait. We did not find him among either English 
philosophers or English literary men (though he qualified for both 
groups); instead he had been placed among the few who were 
categorized as "prophets." This classification is not at all far-fetched. 
The far-ranging scope of his concerns and their relevance to most 
of onr contemporary concerns is striking. The great bulk of his 
writing, particularly his essays, periodical articles, and such books 
as Three Essays on Religion, On Liberty, and The Subjection of 
Women, has an astonishing immediacy. At a time when the word 
urelevant" is most often misused as a synonym for "contemporary,'� 
I would like to examine with you some of his words both in their 
relation to the history of an attitude and for their pertinence to­
day. My title "The Noisy Conflict of Half-Truths" is a quotation 
from Mill's essay on Coleridge. It indicates both my theme and 
one of Mill's most persistent concerns: the complex nature of 
truth and the necessity of a reasoned dialectic in onr attempts to 
reach truth. 
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"Antagonistic modes of thought [are J as necessary to one another 
in speculation, as mutually checking powers are in a political con­
stitution," wrote John Stuart Mill in his essays on two apparently 
irreconcilable thinkers, Jeremy Bentham and Samnel Taylor Cole­
ridge. Mill called them "the two great seminal minds of England 
in their age," and believed that the combination of these two 
''half-men'' and their opposed ideas would have constituted some­
thing very near to the whole truth of the nineteenth century in 
England. For Mill, the truth inherent in any single point of view 
can only be properly estimated when it has infiltrated into minds 
of very different convictions-"when the noisy conflict of half-truths 
has subsided, and ideas which seemed mutually incompatible have 
been found only to require mutual limitations." Actually, Mill 
asserted, Bentham and Coleddge "were connected by two of the 
closest bonds of association-resemblance and contrast," and "all 
that is positive in the opinion of either of them is true."! 
Mill's conviction that the only possible approach to truth is a 
dialectical one is grounded in his philosophy of history and on 
the laws of social progress which he believed are to be discovered 
in the movements of history. He believed that the single most 
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significant factor causing social and historical change is the ability 
of man to speculate and the nature of man's opinions and beliefs. 
In the sixth book of his Logic he wrote: 
Every considerable advance in material civilization has 
been preceded by an advance in knowledge, and when 
any great social change has come to pass, either in the 
way of gradual development or of sudden conflict, it has 
had for its precursor a great change in the opinion and 
modes of thinking of society. 
Mill did not, as did Aristotle, proceed on the assumption that 
"all men by natnre desire to know." In fact he recognized that 
such curious and inquring men are woefully few. In an early 
series of articles which he called "The Spirit of the Age," he 
developed the theory that history is essentially an alternation of 
two sorts of epochs, "Natnral" and "Transitional." A natnral (or 
"Organic") period is one of comparative calm and settled convic­
tion, in which the men who hold power tend to be those who are 
best equipped to rule and there is a general unanimity of outlook 
and belief. The age of transition is-as its name implies-an un­
easy yet necessary period of change. Mill's own time, he believed, 
was "pregnant with change." Such a time is distinguished by a 
wider diffusion of superficial knowledge without the necessary 
balance of wise authorities whose influence unites profound knowl­
edge with the power to disseminate it. The state of public opinion 
in such a time is chaotic, says Mill, and "the young are ready to 
advertise for opinions." It is true that the settled order of the "nat­
uraf' period sometimes gives rise to a confidence in itself which 
is both blind and unfounded; but a time of transition is one of 
"suspicion and distrust"-of intellectual confusion when, as the 
poet Yeats wrote of a more recent period of chaos and change: 
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, 
The best lack all conviction, while the worst 
Are full of passionate intensity.2 
One of the unhappiest consequences of such a time is the dog­
matic divisions among men, the major division being between what 
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Mill called "men of the past," to whom the manifestations of the 
times are cause for terror and revulsion, and "men of the present," 
for whom they are a "subject of exaltation-new men who insist 
upon being governed in a new way.'" This division is frequently 
identical with the gap between the generations-though this is 
not necessarily the case. In such a time old opinions are discarded 
but no new ones which can win any sort of unanimous consent are 
established. Such a state is "at best one of convalescence rather 
than of health," says Mill. TI,e gradual recovery of health implied 
in the word convalescence is manifested, he believed, in tl,e 
erosion of old and entrenched prejudices at such a time tluough an 
increase of the discussion of ideas-of the dialectical examination 
of different viewpoints. 
Unlimited discussion is the cornerstone of Mill's theory of truth 
and progress; yet he was fully aware of its dangers and pitfalls. 
He knew that to discuss means to question established opinions. 
He knew that the discovery of new truths is not nearly "so certain 
a consequence" of discussion as is the discovery of error, and that 
"the moment and tl,e mood of mind in which men break loose 
from an error is not ... the most favorable to those mental pro­
cesses which are necessary to the investigation of truth." V\That 
causes error in the first place, he believed, is our rooted "incapacity 
for seeing more than one thing at a time," and when we break 
with the old habits of thought we do not necessarily lose this habit 
of onesided dogmatism. Mill wrote in The Spirit of the Age that 
Whether men adhere to old opinions or adopt new ones, 
they have in general an invincible propensity to split the 
truth, and take half, or less than half of it; and a habit 
of erecting their quills and bristling up like a porcupine 
against anyone who brings them the other half, as if he 
were attempting to deprive them of the portion which 
they have.' 
There is no more persistent theme tluoughout Milr s writings than 
the conviction that truth is complex and manifold and must never 
be without the stimulus of a polar opposition if it wishes to sur­
vive. He wrote in On Liberty that 
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Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a 
question of the reconciling and combining of opposites 
that very few have minds sufficiently capacious and im­
partial to make the adjustment . . . without the rough 
process of a struggle between combatants fighting under 
hostile banners.5 
This dialectical cast of mind which recognizes the contradictions 
at the heart of things and realizes the necessity, in Mill's words, 
for the "reconciling and combining of opposites," has a long history. 
Just as the men of transitional eras are divided between "old" and 
"new," so men throughout history have been divided between those 
who are uncomfortable without an either/or or a nothing/but ap­
proach to trnth, and those who are able to accept the necessary 
tension of the both/ and. 
Mill based his dialectical approach to practical trnth on what 
he believed to be the laws of historical change, while others have 
built upon their metaphysical conceptions of the nature of the 
universe. Foremost among these last is Heracleitus, who lived in 
the fifth century B.C. The fragments which remain to us of his 
cryptic utterances have had an influence out of proportion to 
their length. The persistent philosophical dilemma of the one 
versus the many, of whether there is cosmic unity underneath the 
confusion of multiplicity, found a creative reconciliation in the 
teachings of this Pre-Socratic philosopher. For Heracleitus, as for 
many more recent thinkers, the nniverse is better understood as a 
process of becoming rather than as a state of being, as in con­
stant change and flux instead of remaining within fixed categories. 
Yet underneath the tension and interplay, the alternation and ex­
change of opposites, Heracleitus asserted, there exists the physical 
nnity of cosmic fire, "kindled in measure and quenched in mea­
sure," and the spiritual nnity of the Divine Mind or Logos. "From 
things that differ comes the most beautiful harmony," he wrote; 
and again, "That which diflers with itself is in agreement; harmony 
consists of opposing tensions, like that of the bow and the lyre."6 
The early nineteenth century philosopher Hegel was profonndly 
influenced by Heracleitus, and like him believed that the clashing 
interaction of opposites are united within the Divine. Hegel 
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thought that the iuevitable "accidents" of human experience are 
to be conceived of iu teITIlS of the "Divine Idea working itself out 
through history." But Mill once confessed that he ''became nausea­
ted" whenever he read Hegel; and certainly there is a broad diver­
gence of spirit between Hegel's arbitrary resolution of conflicts 
within the limits of a single fixed system and Mill's insistence on 
the necessity of a continuiug live and open-ended dialectic. 
Another great thinker who fully realized the tension of op­
posites was Goethe. It was from Kant's scientific writings, he said, 
that 
I grasped the idea that attraction and repulsion are es­
sential constituents of matter and that neither can be di­
vorced from the other iu the concept of matter. This led 
me to the recognition of polarity as a basic feature of all 
creation. 
And later he wrote, "They say that given two diametrically op­
posed opinions, the truth lies midway between them. Not at all! 
It is the problem that lies between them-life eternally active but 
mistakenly conceived as at rest.''' This statement of Goethe's pro­
vides an essential warniug to counteract those who tend to simplify 
contradiction by recourse to compromise. The purely quantitative 
middle position, as Aristotle pOiuts out iu his Ethics, can actually 
be less true than one of the extremes on <lither side. The "golden 
mean" is not a quantitative one. 
Goethe was a major influence on the thiuking of the GeITIlan 
novelist Thomas Mann. A view of reality as infinitely rich and 
complex and of truth as many-sided is a theme in all of Mann's 
novels, but particularly in The Magic Mountain. In the climactic 
"Snow" chapter of that novel, he writes that "man is the lord of 
counter-positions." 
Persistent iuquiry, an attitude of toleration, and discussion be­
tween adherents of different Viewpoints, then, is the necessary 
means, according to Mill, for the attaiument of vital and necessary 
truths. In his book On Liberty he deals with what he calls "the 
real morality of public discussiou." He believed that one of the 
most essential prerequisites for becomiug a philosopher is iutellec­
tual receptivity-the ability to learn from other miuds. (It was 
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Bentham's inability to thus learn that caused Mill to refer to him 
as a "one-eyed" man.) Mill believed that verdicts of opinion should 
be determined by individual circumstances, and that anyone who 
displays "a want of candor, malignity, bigotry, or any intolerance 
of feeling" should be condemned. Equally, anyone should be 
honored-on whichever side-who has the "calmness to see and 
honesty to state what his opponents and their opinions really are­
suggesting nothing to their discredit, keeping nothing back which 
tells . . . in their favor." It is especially important that the pro­
ponent of a particular viewpoint, he said, should "listen to all that 
is said against him-profiting by the part that is just and ex­
pounding the fallacy of what is not."· 
Even such ideal discourse is beset with some real dangers, Mill 
realized. Dispassion and open-mindedness can easily become an 
uncritical subjectivism. In times of transition, especially, men are 
apt to rely indiscriminately on private judgment. Uninformed men, 
unable to understand and appreciate an argument, tend to blame 
the argument rather than themselves. "Truth, they think, is under 
a peremptory obligation of being intelligible to them." One of the 
reasons that in such times personal judgments are preferred to 
those of authority is that the many divisions among the authorities 
cause the uninstructed to lose faith in them. Then it is that the 
"amateur of ideas," with unbounded confidence in his own opin­
ions, however crude and unreasonable they may be, feels justified 
in rejecting the qualified person as a mere "theorist." "And that 
word," writes Mill, "which expresses the highest and noblest ef­
fort of human intelligence is hlrned into a byword of derision.'" 
(I need not cite chapter and verse here from the mass of recent 
anti-intellectual and anti-academic pronouncements in order for you 
to recognize the modem parallels. Everyone from Timothy Leary 
to Martha Mitchell has had his say as the accepted oracle of 
our time.) 
Another cause for the rejection of reasoned truth is the tendency 
to equate reliable judgment with something loosely called "com­
monsense." Mill, like Aristotle, believed fumly in the authority of 
cumulative humau experience; but one must always make sure, 
he says, "that the conclusions of commonsense are confumed by 
accurate knowledge." 
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Then there is the danger that the "half-instructed" -being only 
half-convinced-will be easy victims of the sort of propaganda or 
persuasion that twists the truth. "There is not a truth," wrote Mill, 
''however obvious and simple, the evidence of which an ingenious 
and artful sophist may not succeed in rendering doubtful to the 
uninformed, who insist upon judging all things by their own light." 
Finally, perhaps the most insidious danger of all, an exposure to 
free discourse can sometimes prove so unsettling to the dogmatic 
person that he may take refuge in a pervasive scepticism and re­
fuse any further active commitment or involvement. "A person 
may be without a single prejudice," said Mill, "and yet be entirely 
unfit for every purpose in nature. To have erroneous convictions 
is an evil, but to have no strong or deep-seated convictions is an 
enormous eviL"lo Mill's great ability to learn from other minds 
was never an excuse for scepticism or vacillation on his part. He 
believed in systems of connected truth in polities and ethics as 
well as in the natural sciences; but he also believed that human 
nature must proceed step by step in seeking them. 
Today's conflict of half-truths is a particularly noisy one, and 
the combatants are particularly polarized and alienated from each 
other. The tendency of the young to "advertise for opiniOns" 
rather than to seek them from the wisdom of their elders or from 
the past has become a hackneyed topic today. Mill saw the mani­
festation of this spirit in his time as another example of the victory 
of half-truth. Certainly the wisdom of age is not necessarily char­
acterized by "narrowness of mind and obstinate prejudice." He 
points out in ''The Spirit of the Age" that the opinions and feelings 
of older people are more deeply rooted than are those of the young 
and such long-standing convictions are "essential to all dignity . .. 
and to all fitness for guiding and governing mankind." But he 
warns that in a time of upheaval deep-rooted convictions can 
very quickly become self-defensive prejudices. It is in such times, 
Mill says, that it becomes possible that the young do know more 
than the old, since it is much harder to unlearn than to learn; 
fortunately, most of the time society has more need of learning 
than unlearning. In the case where the young do know more, their 
half of the truth-the truth of the "new men" -is as inadequate as 
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the other half would be alone. "There is but little wisdom in any 
one head . . .  ," says Mill, "at a time when the young are wiser than 
the old."ll 
Claims and counter claims for the Establishment versus the so­
called "Counter-Culture" ring out on today's noisiest battlefield. 
There are those like Theodore Roszak, author of The Making of a 
Counter-Culture, who see today's rebellion against authority as a 
vitally necessary alternative to what Roszak calls "the final con­
solidation of the organized technocracy toward which our society 
is moving inexorably." The arguments of those who share this 
viewpoint range from the lyrically brilliant vision of Charles Reich's 
The Greening of America to the often mindless effusions of those 
already integrated within unstructure, who-since their standards 
are wholly and proudly subjective-are unable to discuss their 
rationale in terms of any broader perspective. 
Pitted against the defenders of the Counter-Culture are voices 
of frightened hate advocating ruthless suppression of all dissent. 
Fortunately there are also other and more dispassionate observers 
who seek to understand rather than to condemn, to trace causes 
and suggest remedies rather than merely to "view with alarm." 
Some historical and psychological analysts have compared the var­
ious manifestations of today's "flight from reason"-the growth of 
mystical cults of all sorts, drugs, deafening rock music, nihilistic 
art, ash·ology, tarot card, violence and vandalism, and similar pat­
terns of behavior in the United States since Hiroshiroa-to the be­
havior of Cenh·al Europeans in the fifteenth and early sixteenth 
centuries, a time in which masses of people obsessed with the 
terror of death sought refuge in madness.l2 
Today's fiction, for instance, grows increasingly apocalyptic; and 
there is a growing number of writers who deal with the subject of 
madness in modern society. One of the best known is Doris Les­
sing, whose novels, particularly her most recent, Briefing For A 
Descent Into Hell, deal with this theme. The "other half of the 
truth" in this novel and in various recent psychological studies of 
the subject is that in such times as ours, madness is often a more 
appropriate response to a sick society than so-called "normalcy" 
and "adjustroent" to its pressures. The psychologist Laing in his 
book The Politics of Experience says that at times madness can 
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be "a breakthrough as well as a breakdown." The poet Theodore 
Roethke in the poem "In a Dark Time," asks 
What's madness but nobility of soul 
At odds with circumstance? 
More constructively, perhaps, Alvin Tomer in his best-selling 
Future Shock compares our breakneck flight into an uncharted 
future to the astronauts' space flights, with the crucial difference 
that we are unprepared and without protection. He writes that 
"the dizzying disorientation and breakdown of rational response 
when people are overwhelmed by demands for rapid adaptation 
[is J threatening to the future of rationality itself." He too views 
the manifestations of unreason in our culture as symptoms of 
breakdown. He analyzes the various kinds of inadequate responses 
that we tend to give to the contradictory demands of our time. 
Two of these maladaptions are particularly related to the theme 
o f  half-truth: one inadequate response, says Tofiler, is reversion to 
formerly successful but now irrelevant adaptations. Such nostalgic 
solutions are not limited to the conservative elements in our society; 
Tomer believes that "the same glorification of the past infects the 
various hippie offshoots of the new left as it does the extreme 
right." Indian headdress, granny glasses, bucolic communes are 
all of them attempts to ape a Simpler past. He calls such manifesta­
tions "the Rousseauistic cult of the Noble Savage," and ''Reversion­
ism masking as Revolution." Closely allied with this response is 
the adaptation of the "Super-Sinlplifier," who clutches, he says, 
at "one single neat equation" as the answer to all problems. A 
Single idea or single "villain" is invested with universal relevance: 
e.g., such formulized half-truths as Dr. Spack's permissiveness is 
the root of all our evils; all protest is the result of an organized 
Communistic conspiracy; LSD will provide the heightened vision 
that our times require; violence is the only way to end violence 
and correct abuses; etc. Reductive answers such as these do serve 
to remove frustrating doubt from their holders, but, says Tomer, 
they "dangerously evade the rich complexity of experience." 
Recently, in a New Yorker article, the critic George Steiner, writ­
ing of new developments in the life sciences and their impact on 
all of our lives. said: 
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Not since the sixteenth century has scientific and philoso­
phical thought been as conscious of the woven texture of 
experience, of the multitudinous skeins and cross-weave 
of relations whereby human consciousness, language, and 
the phenomenology of the 'real world' are close bound.!3 
The both/ and habit of mind has always been found in the few 
rather than the many and has always involved the rare and difficult 
ability to live with tension, with unresolved dilemmas, and without 
the security of a single solution. Mill's analysis of such difficult 
transitional times included the hope and vision of an ensuing 
synthesis-a return to the more organic wholeness of a "normaY' 
time after the necessary adjustments and changes are made. Yet, 
unless we count the period immediately preceding World War I 
as such an organic era, it appears that the century since Mill wrote 
has been merely an accelerating time of change and upheaval. 
Today we face a more uncertain prospect than even the "'new 
men" of Mill's time could anticipate. Though Mill never minimized 
the degree to which a time of transition could dislocate those 
enduring its uncertainties, and though he scrupulously avoided the 
temptation to settle for any forced or premature synthesis, he 
nevertheless firmly believed in the '1aws" of social progress and 
in the inevitable return to a new and better peliod of equilibrium. 
Most of us today cannot go much beyond a commitment to the 
''hazardous perhaps" of an unknown future. Some men, too, have 
begun to doubt whether there is any necessary ending to a time 
that Mill thought of as transitional. Yet today, as always, there 
are the few who are convinced that the nature of truth demands 
an open rather than a closed attitude. 
Approaching eighty, in the last year of his life, Thomas Mann 
closed his essay on Chekov with these words which pOignantly 
characterize his life-long habit of mind: 
To the question 'What am I to do?' one can but answer: 
'Upou my honor and conscience, I don't know.' Neverthe­
less one goes on working ... giving form to truth, hoping 
darkly, sometimes almost confidently, that truth and serene 
form will avail to set free the human spmt and prepare 
mankind for a better, lovelier, worthier life.!4 
12 
DORIS C. MEYERS 
And elsewhere, Nietzsche warned such rare individuals that 
The hour presses men and so they press you. And from 
you too they require a Yes or a No. And woe to you if you 
want to set your chair between For and Against. Do not 
be [concerned J, lover of truth, because of these inflexible 
and oppressive men. Truth has never yet clung to the arm 
of an inHexible man.'s 
One of Mill's most powerful (and least accepted) arguments in 
On Lib81ty is  directed toward the vital service that free discussion 
renders to even the most unquestioned and thoroughly established 
values and truths. "However true a opinion may be," he writes, 
"if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be 
held as a dead dogma, not as a living truth." If Truth itself re­
mains unchallenged and unexamined, "it abides in the mind, but 
abides as a prejudice"; so that if the "opponents of all important 
truths do not exist it is indispensible to imagine them and to supply 
them with the strongest arguments." 
Last year at the Century Club dinner my friend and colleague 
Jerry Stone discussed the need for the human and the technical 
aspects of life to be brought into "one single focus," and for the 
union of Christian and secular insights to be fused into one sub­
stance of truth. I hope he will forgive me for borrowing a sentence 
from his fine talk: he said that "Education should participate in 
unfolding the forms through which life's meaning is expressed." I 
would make it even stronger-Education must participate in such 
an unfolding. The University must remain a place where a free, 
responsible, and vital dialectic can flourish, or it will become a 
closed prison of old half-truths that have lost their meaning and 
force. 
Certainly the free exchange of opinions can and does sometimes 
develop partisans more deeply entrenched in prejudice than be­
fore. Mill deplored what he called the "sectarianism" of his day, 
and we are suffering greatly from the "polarizations" in our society. 
But this danger, as well as all the other risks of a free dialectic, is 
inHnitely less threatening to society than fanatical repression and 
closed-minded dogmatism-on whatever side they manifest them-
13 
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selves. As Mill wrote in On Liberty, "It is not the violent conflict 
between parts of the truth, but the quiet suppression of half the 
truth that is the formidable evil." 
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